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INFORMATION ASYMMETRY AND INSURANCE IN AFRICA 
 
 
 
Simplice A. Asongu1 and Nicholas M. Odhiambo2 
 
Abstract 
In this study, we assess the relevance of decreasing information asymmetry on life and non-
life insurance consumption, by using data from 48 African countries during the period 2004-
2014. Reduced information asymmetry is proxied by information sharing offices, namely: 
public credit registries and private credit bureaus. The empirical evidence is based on the 
Generalised Method of Moments. The findings show that information sharing offices increase 
insurance consumption with a comparatively higher magnitude in life insurance penetration, 
relative to non-life insurance penetration. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed.   
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1. Introduction 
This study is motivated by two main factors, notably: (i) low insurance penetration in Africa 
and (ii) gaps in the information asymmetry and insurance literature. The points are 
substantiated in chronological order. 
 First, as recently documented by Kyerematen (2015), insurance penetration in Africa 
is low compared to other regions of the world. According to the author, with the exception of 
South Africa, approximately 5% of Africa has access to insurance services. Moreover, the 
discourse maintains that two main factors can elucidate the underlying feeble penetration, 
namely: demand- and supply-side considerations and structural characteristics. These factors 
entail information sharing offices (i.e. public credit registries and private credit bureaus) that 
have been established across the continent in order to reduce information asymmetry in the 
banking and insurance industry (Kusi et al., 2017;  Kusi & Opoku‐Mensah,  2018). 
 
1 Corresponding author[Senior Researcher]; Department of Economics, University of South Africa, P.O. Box 
392, UNISA 0003, Pretoria, South Africa. Email: asongusimplice@yahoo.com 
2Professor; Department of Economics, University of South Africa, P.O. Box 392, UNISA 0003 Pretoria, South 
Africa. Email: odhianm@unisa.ac.za 
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Unfortunately, the extant literature on information asymmetry and insurance in Africa has 
failed to assess how the former has influenced the latter. 
 Second, the literature on insurance has largely been oriented along two main strands, 
namely: linkages between insurance penetration and development outcomes (Ioncică et al., 
2012; Akinlo, 2015; Alhassan & Biekpe, 2015, 2016a)    and drivers of insurance 
consumption (Zerriaa et al., 2017; Guerineau & Sawadogo, 2015; Alhassan & Biekpe, 
2016b). This research extends the latter strand of the literature by assessing the relevance of 
information sharing in driving insurance. Accordingly, the extant literature on information 
asymmetry in Africa has fundamentally focused on credit risk (Kusi et al., 2017), cost of 
funding (Kusi & Opoku‐Mensah,  2018), financial access (Triki & Gajigo, 2014;  Muaza & 
Alagidede, 2017) and market power (Asongu et al., 2018; Boateng et al., 2018; Asongu & 
Odhiambo, 2019a).  
 In the light of the attendant Africa-centric literature, Kusi et al. (2017) establish that 
information sharing offices mitigate bank risk. As an extension of the findings, Kusi and 
Opoku‐Mensah  (2018) find that the credit registries also reduce funding costs.  According to 
Triki and Gajigo (2014), information sharing offices enhance access to finance, with a greater 
positive response from private credit bureaus. Asongu et al. (2016) extend Triki and Gajigo 
(2014) to conclude that information sharing offices do not enhance financial access. 
Differences in the findings are traceable to periodicity and methodological differences. 
Muaza and Alagidede (2017) conclude that information sharing offices increase financial 
access and countries with English common law heritage benefit more from the institution of 
these information sharing mechanisms, compared to their counterparts with French civil law 
heritage.  Motivated by previous findings that the absence of a positive link between 
information sharing offices and credit access may be due to the abuse of market power or 
Quiet Life Hypothesis (QLH) by large financial institutions: (i)Asongu and Odhiambo 
(2019a) have tested the QLH in the African banking industry to confirm evidence of the 
hypothesis; (ii) Boateng et al. (2018) have established that information sharing offices do not 
significantly reduce market power and (iii) Asongu et al. (2018) have concluded that 
information technology reduces the unfavourable effect of market power on financial access.  
 In the light of the above, this study complements the extant literature by assessing the 
relationship between information sharing offices and insurance consumption. Hence, the 
research question this study aims to answer is the following: how does information 
asymmetry affect life and non-life insurance consumption in Africa? 
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 The intuition for the linkage between information sharing offices and insurance is 
based on the fact that the sharing of information by information sharing offices can reduce 
information asymmetry associated with insurance premiums. For instance, the premium on a 
life insurance subscription can decrease if the associated adverse selection is reduced when 
the financial institution has more information on the credit history of the client making the 
insurance subscription. Hence, it follows that information asymmetry (sharing) related to a 
specific insurance subscription is positively (negatively) associated with the insurance 
premium. The intuition on the nexus between information asymmetry and insurance 
premiums is consistent with the theoretical and empirical underpinnings motivating the 
information asymmetry and financial access literature highlighted above and critically 
engaged in Section 2. 
 The positioning of the study is also motivated by the need to extend a recent stream of 
research in international business and finance, focusing on inter alia: the effectiveness of 
credit reporting systems on loan delinquency in banking systems (Ghosh, 2019); the 
relevance of dependence modelling of risks associated with non-life insurance on capital 
requirements (Mejdoub & Arab, 2018); nexuses between information and communication 
technology, information sharing and market power (Asongu & Biekpe, 2018);  linkages 
between insurance, shadow banking and financial sector stability (Diallo & Al-Mansour, 
2017) and connections between foreign direct investment firms, information asymmetry and 
accounting quality (Wang, 2017).  
 The rest of the study is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses information 
asymmetry, credit market and insurance. The data and methodology are covered in Section 3 
while Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes with implications and 
future research directions.   
 
2. Information asymmetry, credit markets and insurance  
2.1 Information asymmetry  
Different measures of information asymmetry exist in the literature. Dierkens (1991) 
employed four proxies to measure the level of information asymmetry between the market 
and firm managers, within the framework of equity markets.  Dai et al. (2013), Tchamyou 
and Asongu (2017a) and Tchamyou et al. (2018) have built on Dierkens (1991) to measure 
information asymmetry as the standard deviation of idiosyncratic risks of returns in the 
mutual fund industry.  
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 Some authors have substantially relied on index construction. This is the case in 
financial markets where price formation can be affected by traders who are better informed 
(Bharath et al., 2009, p. 3215). Accordingly, given that it is intuitive to predict that market 
players (i.e. analysts, suppliers, traders and employees) who are closer to a firm’s business 
would make more informed market decisions, market microstructure analysts have estimated 
information asymmetry about a specific corporation from observable market data, inter alia: 
bid-ask spreads, trades, quotes and transaction prices.  
 Information asymmetry can also be seen in the light of “ownership” because it is an 
important mechanism through which information sharing can be appreciated (Ivashina, 2009, 
p. 300). Hence, for a given project,  a party’s share of ownership informs other parties about 
how much information the underlying party has on the project under consideration, ceteris 
paribus. Participation in a syndicated bank loan is an example of this type of information 
asymmetry. In accordance with theoretical estimates, the share of the lead bank (in relation to 
participating banks) in the collective loan is indicative of how much information the lead 
bank has on the borrower’s solvency and hence, information asymmetry in a loan is 
observable from the perspective of a loan spread (Tanjung et al., 2010, p. 2). In summary, if 
the share of the lead bank is low, it is associated with adverse selection ex-ante of syndication 
and moral hazard ex-post of syndication.  These dynamics of information asymmetry build on 
the fact that, as an agent in the lending syndication, the lead bank collects and processes 
borrower information. 
 The measurement of information asymmetry that best fits the context of the present 
study is the use of information sharing offices (ISO) in the perspective of public credit 
registries and private credit bureaus. While the previous three sets of measurements are more 
consistent with microeconomic or financial market data, public credit registries and private 
credit bureaus are more in line with macroeconomic indicators from the World Bank. 
Moreover, our choice of this information sharing mechanism is in accordance with recent 
information asymmetry literature (Asongu et al., 2019; Mauza & Alagidede, 2017; 
Tchamyou & Asongu, 2017b). 
 
2.2 Information sharing and banking/insurance market  
Over the past decades, credit market failures have been considerably associated with 
information asymmetry in the banking industry (Besanko & Thakor, 1987; Stiglitz & Weiss, 
1981; Claus & Grimes, 2003; Dell’Ariccia & Marquez, 2006; Boateng et al., 2018; Asongu 
& Odhiambo, 2019b). The empirical literature is also broadly consistent on the position that 
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such information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers can be alleviated through the 
establishment of information sharing offices that readily and timeously collect and exchange 
information on borrowers’ characteristics in order to reduce adverse selection experienced by 
banks on the one hand and moral hazard from borrowers on the other (Brown et al., 2009; 
Djankov et al., 2007; Boateng et al., 2018). The studies broadly support the perspective that 
ISO enhances credit expansion as well as constitutes a relevant determinant of profitability 
and competition in the banking and insurance industry (Pagano & Jappelli, 1993; Padilla & 
Pagano, 2000; Brown & Zehnder, 2010; Karapetyan & Stacescu, 2014a, 2014b). However, 
there is another strand of the literature which posits that ISO may not engender the postulated 
theoretical appeals. We substantiate the contending strands in chronological order.  
 In the first strand, it has been argued and substantiated that the sharing of information 
mitigates moral hazard, reduces adverse selection, increases discipline on the part of 
borrowers and promotes competition within the banking and insurance  sector. The 
perspective has been maintained by a number of scholars who argue that ISO eliminates 
barriers to information across banks/insurers, therefore, enabling banks/insurers to increase 
lending to borrowers and reduce default rates from borrowers (Padilla & Pagano, 1997, 2000; 
Jappelli & Pagano, 2002, 2006; Bennardo et al., 2015). The fact that the repayment ability of 
borrowers is increased with the help of ISO has been substantiated by Karapetyan and 
Stacescu (2014a) and Klein (1992). According to the narrative, borrowers are encouraged to 
repay their debts upon the threats of outright exclusion or higher interest rates in future 
borrowing operations.  
In the second strand, whereas there is a broad consensus on the beneficial impact of 
ISO, there is a contrasting position in the literature which maintains that there is also a 
negative side to the sharing of information. The perspective that when information is shared, 
some advantages are lost by incumbent banks in relation to their competitors is maintained by  
Karapetyan and Stacescu (2014a) who support the argument that, when these advantages are 
lost, financial institutions can still fight to acquire information of a different nature in order to 
gain some competitive advantage from more strategic information that is not shared with 
information sharing offices.  Some authors also posit that in spite of purported advantages 
from information sharing, such as a reduction in the probability of default on the part of 
borrowers, access to credit by riskier borrowers can also increase (Jappelli &  Pagano, 2006;  
Brown et al., 2009). According to Brown et al. (2009) and Jappelli and Pagano (2006), the 
pool of borrowers can be disproportionately altered by a higher entrance of riskier borrowers, 
hence, resulting in aggregately higher levels of default. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) 
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establish that the sharing of information on credit contributes to banking crises. Scholars in 
this strand are consistent on the view that the introduction of information sharing offices can 
also substantially reduce the willingness of banks and insurers to collect and share 
information on borrowers’ characteristics.  
 The underlying borrowers’ characteristics can be used to determine insurance 
premiums for both life insurance (e.g. permanent and term life policies) and non-life 
insurance. Examples of non-life insurance include: auto insurance, property insurance, health 
insurance, accident insurance, travel insurance, disaster insurance, credit insurance and 
mortgage insurance. Accordingly, borrowers’ history of credit worthiness and payment 
characteristics collected and shared by information sharing offices can determine the amount 
of insurance premium requested by an insurance firm in relation to cars, property, health, 
accidents, travel, disasters, credit and mortgage. From logic and intuition, if a borrower has a 
poor credit and repayment history, the insurer is likely to increase the attendant insurance 
premium in order to hedge against the potential risk of irresponsible behaviour.  
 
2.3 Insurance in Africa 
 As highlighted in the introduction, the sparse literature on insurance in Africa has 
focused on two main strands, notably:  drivers of life insurance subscriptions (Guerineau & 
Sawadogo, 2015; Zerriaa et al., 2017; Alhassan & Biekpe, 2016b) and nexuses between 
insurance subscription and macroeconomic outcomes (Ioncică et al., 2012; Akinlo, 2015; 
Alhassan & Biekpe, 2015, 2016a). The two dimensions are expanded in the paragraphs that 
follow.  
With regard to the first strand on drivers of insurance, Guerineau and Sawadogo  
(2015) have examined the determinants of life insurance in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), 
focusing on a sample of 20 countries during the period 1996-2011. The authors control for 
potential concerns of endogeneity by means of an instrumental variable approach to conclude 
on a positive nexus between life insurance premiums and income per capita. According to the 
authors, life insurance represents a luxury commodity in the sub-region. Furthermore, the 
development of life insurance is negatively associated with life expectancy and young 
dependency ratios while the old dependency ratios, property rights protection and 
government stability engender positive outcomes.  
The determinants of demand for life insurance have been examined by Zerriaaet al. 
(2017) within the framework of Tunisia with data of annual periodicity for the period 1990-
2014. From the findings, it is apparent that pension expenditures decrease the demand for life 
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insurance, interest and inflation rates have opposite incidences whereas the following factors 
have the opposite impact: income, financial development, dependency, urbanization and life 
expectancy. Alhassan and Biekpe (2016b) have investigated factors that influence life 
insurance using a sample of 31 countries in Africa over the period 1996-2010. From the 
findings of the authors, demographic factors have a higher explanatory power on life 
insurance, when compared with financial drivers. Moreover, the study shows that the 
consumption of life insurance is reduced by inflation, life expectancy and dependency 
whereas the following factors engender a positive influence, namely: health expenditure, 
insurance consumption, financial development and the quality of institutions.  
 In the second strand pertaining to nexuses between insurance consumption and 
economic development, Alhassan and Biekpe (2015) have examined the relationships 
between productivity, efficiency and economies of scale in the non-life insurance market in 
South Africa for the period 2007-2012. By employing data envelopment analysis, 
bootstrapped and logistic estimations, the findings reveal that about one-fifth of insurers carry 
out their operations optimally while non-life insurers are characterized by an inefficiency of 
approximately 50%.  The results show that ameliorations in productivity are determined by 
technological changes as well as evidence of a non-linear effect of size on efficiency and 
constant returns to scale. Moreover, the results also reveal that product line diversification, 
reinsurance and leverage have significant relationships with efficiency and constant returns to 
scale.  
 Akinlo (2015) examined the causal nexus between economic growth and insurance in 
a sample of 30 SSA countries by employing a panel heterogeneous causality estimation 
approach for the period 1995-2011. The research results show bidirectional causality between 
economic prosperity and insurance. Moreover, the main characteristic of the causality is that 
it is homogenous across sampled countries. In another study, Alhassan and Biekpe (2016a) 
investigate the linkage between insurance development and economic growth in eight 
countries in Africa over the period 1990-2010. The sampled countries are: Algeria, Gabon, 
Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa. The empirical evidence 
is based on an autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) approach. From the results, there a 
long-run relationship between the insurance market and economic growth in Kenya, 
Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria and South Africa. According to findings, from the vector error 
correction model (VECM) framework, bidirectional causality is apparent in Morocco while a 
unidirectional causality is established for Algeria and Madagascar. Furthermore, mixed 
causality is evident in Gabon.   
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3. Data and methodology 
3.1. Data 
This research focuses on a panel of 48 countries in Africa for the period 2004-20143. The 
geographical and temporal scopes are limited by data availability constraints. The data are 
from three main sources of the World Bank, namely, the: Financial Development and 
Structure Database (FDSD); World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) and World Bank 
Governance Indicators (WGI) (World Bank, 2018a, 2018b, 2018c).  
 Consistent with the engaged literature on information asymmetry, information sharing 
(or reducing information asymmetry) is measured with public credit registries and private 
credit bureaus (Muazu & Alagidede, 2017; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018; Boateng et al., 
2018), while the insurance variables employed are the only two indicators provided by the 
FDSD, notably: life insurance and non-life insurance premiums.  
In the light of the discussed insurance literature in Section 2, two main control 
variables are adopted for the study, namely: remittances and political stability. The choice of 
these control variables is informed by contemporary insurance penetration literature in 
Africa, notably: Asongu and Odhiambo (2020a) have recently established that remittances 
and political stability are favorable determinants of insurance penetration in Africa.   Only 
two control variables are selected because from a preliminary assessment, engaging more 
than two control variables influences the estimations unfavorably owing to instrument 
proliferation (even when instruments are collapsed in the process). Accordingly, the 
corresponding over-identification leads to estimations failing to pass post-estimation 
diagnostics tests. The adopted variables in the conditioning information set are anticipated to 
have positive effects on the demand for insurance consumption. On the one hand, remittances 
should positively affect insurance subscriptions because they are mostly sent to the wealthy 
income strata of countries in Africa (Anyanwu, 2011; Meniago & Asongu, 2018). These 
wealthier segments of the population are then more likely to take insurance premiums owing 
to the established positive nexus between income levels and insurance consumption in the 
continent (Guerineau & Sawadogo, 2015; Zerriaa et al., 2017). On the other hand, political 
stability provides enabling conditions for macroeconomic outcomes, including the 
development of the insurance industry.  
 
3The 48 countries include: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, 
Tunisia, Uganda and Zambia.  
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Appendix 1 provides the definitions and sources of the variables while Appendix 2 
discloses the summary statistics. Appendix 3 provides the correlation matrix. From the 
summary statistics, it can be observed from mean values that the variables are comparable. 
Moreover, the corresponding standard deviations displayed are an indication that reasonable 
linkages can emerge from the estimations. The purpose of the correlation matrix is to avoid 
issues of multicollinearity which can bias estimated coefficients due to high degrees of 
substitution between variables in the conditioning information set.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Specification 
 In accordance with recent empirical literature employing the GMM estimation 
approach (Tchamyou, 2019a, 2019b, 2020), at least four main factors motivate the selection 
of the estimation strategy. The factors are discussed as follows in no order of importance. 
First, there are forty-eight countries and eleven years for each country. Hence, the N>T 
condition relevant for the adoption of the GMM technique is in line with the data behaviour 
because 48>11(i.e. 2004 to 2014). Second, the indicators of insurance are persistent because 
the correlations between the indicators with their first lags are higher than the threshold of 
0.800 which is needed for the establishment of persistence (Tchamyou et al., 2019a, 2019b). 
Accordingly: (i) the correlation between life insurance and its first lag is 0.992 whereas (ii) 
the correlation between non-life insurance and its first lag is 0.975.Third, given that the 
adopted estimation approach is consistent with a panel data structure cross-country 
differences are taken into account during the regressions. Fourth, the research takes account 
of endogeneity by controlling for simultaneity in the explanatory variables by means of a 
process of instrumentation. Moreover, the use of time-invariant omitted variables also 
accounts for the unobserved heterogeneity dimension of endogeneity.  
In accordance with the empirical literature on the benefits of limiting instrument 
proliferation (Arellano & Bover, 1995; Blundell & Bond, 1998; Bond et al., 2001; Tchamyou 
& Asongu, 2017b; Boateng et al., 2018), restricting over-identification and controlling for 
cross-sectional dependence,  the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) extension of Arellano and Bover 
(1995) is adopted in this study. A two-step approach is adopted instead of a one-step 
procedure because it accounts for heterogeneity. It is relevant to note that the one-step 
procedure is consistent with homoscedasticity.  
The following equations in level (1) and first difference (2) summarise the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure.  
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where, 
tiI , is either life insurance or non-life insurance subscriptions  in  country i in  period t
, 0 is a constant, AS  represents an information sharing office (a public credit registry or a 
private credit bureau), ASAS  denote quadratic interactions between information sharing 
offices (“public credit registries × public credit registries” or “private credit bureaus × private 
credit bureaus”),   W  is the vector of control variables (remittances and political stability),
represents the coefficient of auto-regression which is one within the framework of this study 
because a year lag is enough to capture past information, t  
is the time-specific constant, i is 
the country-specific effect and 
ti, is the error term.  
 
3.2.2Identification and exclusion restrictions 
  
 It is relevant to articulate identification and exclusion restrictions which are relevant 
in a sound GMM estimation. In accordance with the corresponding literature, all explanatory 
variables are acknowledged as predetermined or suspected endogenous whereas only years 
are considered to be strictly exogenous (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a; Tchamyou, 2019b; 
Boateng et al., 2018). This analytical strategy is in accordance with insights into 
identification documented by Roodman (2009b), who has argued that it is not feasible for 
time invariant variables to be endogenous after a first difference4.  
 Given the above, the time indicators affect the insurance variables exclusively via the 
predetermined indicators. Moreover, the statistical validity of the exclusion restriction is 
investigated with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) which is employed to assess the 
importance of the exclusion restrictions assumption. In essence, in order for this exclusion 
assumption to be valid, the alternative hypothesis of the DHT should be rejected. Therefore, 
in the findings that are disclosed in Section 4, the assumption of exclusion restriction is valid 
if the null hypothesis of the DHT related to instrumental variables (IV) (year, eq(diff)) is not 
rejected5. The identification procedure and mode of validating the assumptions underlying the 
exclusion restrictions is in accordance with the standard instrumental variable procedure. In 
 
4 Hence, the procedure for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv (years, eq(diff))’ whereas the gmmstyle is employed for predetermined variables.  
5 “eq(diff)” stands for equation in difference.  
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this standard procedure, the rejection of the null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying 
Restrictions (OIR) test is an indication that the strictly exogenous variables affect insurance 
indicators exclusively through the suggested endogenous channels (Beck et al., 2003; Asongu 
& Nwachukwu, 2016b).  
 
4. Empirical results  
This section presents the empirical findings. While Table 1 focuses on non-quadratic 
specifications, Table 2 is concerned with quadratic specifications. Accordingly, the former 
table articulates the direct effect of information sharing offices on insurance consumption 
whereas the latter is concerned with how enhancing information sharing offices affect 
insurance subscriptions.  For all tables, four information criteria are employed to assess the 
validity of the GMM model with forward orthogonal deviations6. Based on the information 
criteria, the models are overwhelmingly valid with a few exceptions, notably: (i) the presence 
of auto-correlation in the second specification of life insurance in Table 1 and the last 
specification of life insurance in Table 2 and (ii) the instruments are not valid in the second 
column or first specification of Table 2. 
 The following findings can be established from Table 1.  Both information sharing 
offices positively affect insurance consumption. The significant control variables have the 
expected positive signs. In Table 2, net effects on insurance subscriptions cannot be feasibly 
computed because at least one estimated coefficient needed for their computation is not 
significant. Accordingly, in a quadratic specification, net effects should be computed as the 
sum of the unconditional effect and the marginal effect (Asongu, 2018).  The significant 
control variables also have the expected signs.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR (2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen over-identification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of 
results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fisher test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 
2017, p.200). 
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Table 1: Information Sharing and Insurance 
       
 Dependent variable: Insurance  
 Life  Insurance Non Life Insurance 
       
Constant  0.036 0.001 0.063* 0.099** 0.098** 0.092** 
 (0.533) (0.965) (0.088) (0.035) (0.022) (0.012) 
Life Insurance (-1) 0.892*** 0.869*** 0.847*** --- --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Non Life Insurance (-1) --- --- --- 0.889*** 0.861*** 0.871*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries  0.005*** --- 0.009*** 0.0005 --- 0.001** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.387)  (0.045) 
Private Credit Bureaus  --- 0.007*** 0.008*** --- 0.001* 0.001* 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.081) (0.051) 
Political Stability  0.068* 0.031* 0.061*** 0.055** 0.052** 0.056*** 
 (0.081) (0.061) (0.007) (0.015) (0.010) (0.002) 
Remittances  0.002 0.007*** 0.002 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 
 (0.171) (0.000) (0.246) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
AR(1) (0.159) (0.168) (0.172) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
AR(2) (0.491) (0.477) (0.481) (0.108) (0.092) (0.104) 
Sargan OIR (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.103) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.632) (0.556) (0.512) (0.399) (0.606) (0.394) 
       
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.858) (0.803) (0.822) (0.295) (0.228) (0.341) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.409) (0.355) (0.299) (0.452) (0.791) (0.418) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.864) (0.164) (0.353) (0.523) (0.950) (0.469) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.541) (0.657) (0.557) (0.344) (0.511) (0.338) 
       
Fisher  1843.58*** 2019.84*** 3111.05*** 591.94*** 133.29*** 650.59*** 
Instruments  24 24 28 24 24 28 
Countries  40 40 40 41 41 41 
Observations  315 315 315 335 335 335 
       
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests.  
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Table 2: Enhancing Information Sharing and Insurance 
     
 Life  Insurance Non Life Insurance 
     
Constant  0.168*** 0.054* 0.120** 0.117*** 
 (0.000) (0.067) (0.014) (0.001) 
Life Insurance (-1) 0.893*** 0.908*** --- --- 
 (0.000) (0.000)   
Non Life Insurance (-1) --- --- 0.870*** 0.844*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Public Credit Registries (PCR) -0.001 --- 0.001 --- 
 (0.382)  (0.435)  
Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) --- 0.0005 --- 0.003* 
  (0.676)  (0.064) 
PCR×PCR 0.0001*** --- -0.000 --- 
 (0.000)  (0.713)  
PCB×PCB --- 0.00009*** --- -0.00004 
  (0.001)  (0.143) 
Political Stability  0.108*** 0.038* 0.051** 0.040** 
 (0.000) (0.054) (0.015) (0.019) 
Remittances  0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.008*** 
 (0.002) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
Time Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Net Effects  nsa na na nsa 
     
AR(1) (0.163) (0.170) (0.001) (0.001) 
AR(2) (0.520) (0.495) (0.116) (0.094) 
Sargan OIR (0.001) (0.001) (0.192) (0.003) 
Hansen OIR (0.014) (0.168) (0.471) (0.683) 
     
DHT for instruments     
(a)Instruments in levels     
H excluding group (0.698) (0.502) (0.370) (0.234) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.004) (0.109) (0.491) (0.870) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))     
H excluding group (0.271) (0.297) (0.329) (0.774) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.011) (0.171) (0.525) (0.500) 
     
Fisher  9453.86*** 61540.85*** 5628.95*** 2363.74*** 
Instruments  28 28 28 28 
Countries  40 40 41 41 
Observations  315 315 315 315 
     
***,**,*: significance levels at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the Sargan and Hansen OIR tests. na: not applicable because at least one of the estimated coefficients needed for the 
computation is net effects is not significant. nsa: not specifically applicable because the estimated model does not pass post-estimation 
diagnostic tests.  
 
The findings are broadly consistent with the literature on the favorable 
macroeconomic outcomes of information sharing offices, notably: the positive relevance of 
information sharing offices in, inter alia: enhancing financial access (Triki & Gajigo, 2014;  
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Muaza & Alagidede, 2017), reducing market power (Asongu et al., 2018), mitigating funding 
cost (Kusi & Opoku‐Mensah,  2018 ) and diminishing credit risks (Kusi et al., 2017). 
The results seem to support the idea of enhancing information sharing to improve 
insurance consumption in the case of consumption of life insurance, but the idea is rejected in 
the case of non-life insurance (i.e. Table 2). Moreover, in terms of magnitude of significance, 
information sharing is more favourable for life insurance penetration than it is for non-life 
insurance penetration (i.e. Table 1). The difference can be explained by the fact that 
information sharing offices are largely used by the rich for life insurance purposes, while they 
are used less by the poor for non-life insurance purposes.  This explanation is also traceable 
to established evidence that life insurance promotes income inequality when compared with 
non-life insurance in Africa (Asongu & Odhiambo, 2020b).  
 In the light of the above, the findings can be elicited with the notion of informal 
finance in accordance with the extant literature on the subject (Ligon et al., 2002; Dupas & 
Robinson, 2013; De Magalhaes & Santaeulalia 2018; De Magalhaes et al., 2019). In essence, 
clarifying a principal distinction between other insurance schemes (e.g. non-life insurance) 
and life insurance is worthwhile in understanding why information sharing offices are more 
likely to be used by the rich to increase life insurance compared to the poor. It has been 
established that life insurance for the most part, is useful as savings and is a mechanism by 
which the rich increase their assets (De Magalhaes & Santaeulalia 2018; Dupas & Robinson, 
2013). The corresponding literature maintains that in the light of apparent saving constraints, 
life insurance can be a means of weakening saving constraints in order to increase wealth 
accumulation by the rich.  The explanation is consistent with the perspective that the poor 
elements of society rely for the most part on non-life insurance schemes and hence, need to 
rely less on information sharing offices compared to the rich elements of society who use 
both life and non-life insurance services. Accordingly, the poor depend more on non-life 
insurance schemes because they help smoothen consumption through the life cycle (De 
Magalhaes et al., 2019). Moreover, this perspective on non-life insurance is worthwhile in 
clarifying the findings because informal insurance and savings characterise most of the 
sampled countries which are comparatively poor nations (Carroll, 1997; Ligon et al., 2002; 
Kaplan & Violante, 2010). 
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5. Concluding implications and future research directions 
This study has assessed the role of decreasing information asymmetry in life and non-life 
insurance consumption in 48 African countries for the period 2004-2014. Reduced 
information asymmetry is proxied with information sharing offices, namely: public credit 
registries and private credit bureaus. The empirical evidence is based on the Generalised 
Method of Moments. The findings show that information sharing offices increase insurance 
consumption with a comparatively higher magnitude in life insurance penetration, relative to 
non-life insurance penetration. 
 The main policy implication of this study is that information sharing offices should be 
promoted on the continent in order to enhance the consumption of life and non-life insurance 
commodities which are essential in reducing insecurity and risks. Accordingly, there are 
many benefits of insurance in economic development. Some include: savings, capital 
formation, encouragement of financial stability and decrease of anxiety, reduction of the 
government’s burden and promotion of trade.  
 First, insurance services mobilise savings to support long term investments and 
economic growth. This is essentially because insurance companies also substantially provide 
coverage to business corporations as well as large factions of the population. Second, 
insurance companies improve capital formation in a country by augmenting the capital stock 
of a nation through channels of communication, transport facilities, equipment, and 
machinery, inter alia. Third, by insuring losses and risk of corporations, organizations and 
individuals, insurers contribute towards financial stability. Moreover, the associated stability 
and modulation of associated negative externalities relieve anxiety and tensions in the 
country. Fourth, insurers also reduce the financial burden on the government by providing a 
variety of services that enhance social security and hence, decrease the burden of the 
government in the provision of these services. Fifth, insurance companies promote commerce 
and trade by facilitating the role of banks in granting loans to economic operators involved in 
international trade.  
 Beyond the practical considerations above, the main theoretical contribution of this 
study is that by facilitating the connection between buyers and sellers of insurance premiums, 
insurance companies also act as financial intermediaries between lenders and borrowers by 
facilitating the services in the banking industry because financial transactions have an 
insurance dimension. Hence, insurance companies complement financial intermediary 
institutions by promoting the productive and efficient allocation of capital resources which 
ultimately improve economic productivity.  This complementarity is by means of: (i) 
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reducing transaction costs because insurers mobilize funds from policyholders and invest 
them in multiple projects across countries; (ii) creating liability since policyholders in the 
event of loss are guaranteed a certain compensation in liquidity and (iii) facilitating 
investment and scale economies because insurers enable the financing of large economic 
projects which are associated with economies of scale. In summary, the theoretical 
underpinnings motivating the relevance of information sharing offices in facilitating financial 
intermediation efficiency can be extended to the relevance of information sharing offices in 
facilitating insurance services.  
Future studies can focus on assessing the importance of information sharing offices in 
other macroeconomic outcomes. This is essentially because; these credit registries have only 
been recently instituted across the African continent. Hence, the literature on their relevance 
in macroeconomic outcomes is still relatively scanty, compared to other more advanced 
regions of the world where credit registries have been operational for decades. Moreover, 
future research can also be focused on assessing whether the established findings in this study 
merit empirical scrutiny in other developing regions of the world such as Latin America and 
Asia.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  (Measurements) Sources 
    
 
Insurance   
LifeIns Life Insurance Premium Volume to GDP (%) FDSD 
   
NonLifeIns Non-life Insurance Premium Volume to GDP (%) FDSD 
    
Credit Registries  PCR  Public  Credit Registries (% of adults) WDI 
    
Credit Bureaus  PCB Private Credit Bureaus (% of adults) WDI 
    
Political Stability  PolS “Political stability/no violence (estimate): 
measured as the perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government will be destabilised or overthrown 
by unconstitutional and violent means, including 
domestic violence and terrorism” 
WGI 
    
Remittances Remit Remittance inflows to GDP (%) WDI 
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators of the World Bank. FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database of the 
World Bank. WGI: World Governance Indicators.  
 
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (2004-2014) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Life Insurance  0.881 2.126 0.0006 12.220 346 
Non Life Insurance   0.798 0.536 0.005 2.774 367 
Public Credit Registries  2.750 8.268 0.000 71.900 518 
Private Credit Bureaus  4.937 14.445 0.000 66.200 518 
Political Stability  -0.471 0.905 -2.687 1.182 462 
Remittances  4.313 6.817 0.00003 50.818 416 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
 
 
Appendix 3:Correlation matrix  
       
Information Sharing Control variables Insurance  
PCR PCB PolS Remit LifeIns NonLifeIns  
1.000 -0.112 0.236 0.019 0.080 0.238 PCR 
 1.000 0.306 -0.105 0.205 0.141 PCB 
  1.000 0.040 0.221 0.333 PolS 
   1.000 -0.012 0.161 Remit 
    1.000 0.748 LifeIns 
     1.000 NonLifeIns 
       
PCR: Public Credit Registries. PCB : Private Credit Bureaus. PolS: Political Stability. Remit: Remittances.  
LifeIns: Life Insurance. NonLifeIns: Non Life Insurance.   
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